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Abstract 
Housing costs comprise a major part of most household budgets. Larger 
households require greater space than do smaller households but do not necessarily have 
larger incomes. The cost of extra housing space (e.g. the cost of an extra bedroom) may 
vary across different locations, both absolutely (dollars per week) and proportionately 
(percentage of overall costs). If this is the case, differential regional costs of additional 
space may provide an incentive for different sized households to locate in particular areas 
where housing costs most appropriately fit their needs. Our analysis uses tenancy bond 
rental data to analyse the cost of renting an extra bedroom in different locations 
throughout New Zealand. It discusses the theory of what determines rents. We then 
examine the nature of regional rental costs, testing whether the documented patterns fit 
with theoretical predictions. Finally, we reflect on what the results may imply for social 
outcomes and housing policy in New Zealand. To give a flavour of the issues, consider 
the following. In 2003, the average weekly rental cost of a two bedroom dwelling in 
Auckland was $37 more than for a one bedroom dwelling. The cost of a third bedroom 
was an extra $50 and the cost of a fourth bedroom was an additional $90. Thus weekly 
rental cost for a four bedroom dwelling exceeded that of a one bedroom dwelling by 
$177. In Manawatu-Wanganui, the cost of a two bedroom dwelling was $38 more than 
for a one bedroom dwelling - almost identical to the margin in Auckland. But the cost of 
additional bedrooms was much lower than in Auckland: $29 for a third bedroom and $33 
for a fourth bedroom. This raw data might suggest that it would be beneficial for larger 
households to locate in Manawatu-Wanganui and for smaller households to locate in 
Auckland. However, the interaction with other factors has to be taken into account before 
such a conclusion can be reached. At the minimum, the data suggests there is a material 
issue to be addressed relating to disparities in regional housing costs for different sized 
households. 
JEL classification:  R21; R31; R51 
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Housing costs represent a large proportion of total income for many 
households. In 2001, 33% of households spent at least a quarter of their income on 
housing; 15% of households spent more than two-fifths of their income on 
housing. Housing costs can therefore have a significant impact on living standards 
for many people, and may be particularly germane for lower income households 
that rent. One of the nine variables that comprise the deprivation index for New 
Zealand is "not living in own home" (Crampton et al, 2000). While covering a 
number of categories, the majority of people covered by this variable will be 
renters. An understanding of the determinants of rents across different localities is 
therefore vital for understanding the determinants of overall living standards, 
especially for more deprived households. 
Large families have a greater need for housing services than do smaller 
families. A family with one child may receive quite satisfactory housing quality 
through their rental of a one or two bedroom house or apartment, but a five child 
household may need at least a four bedroom house to achieve the same housing 
quality. In understanding living standard outcomes of large households, we 
therefore need to understand the determinants of housing costs - in this case, 
rentals - for dwellings of different sizes.
1 
In this study, we examine the determinants of rents for houses and 
apartments of different sizes across locations in New Zealand. Initially, we 
analyse the relationship of rents to house prices aggregating together houses of all 
sizes and apartments of all sizes (but maintaining a segregation between houses 
                                                 
1 Henceforth "dwellings" refers to the combined set of houses and apartments; "size" refers to 
number of bedrooms. The terms "apartment" and "flat" are used interchangeably. 2 
and apartments). We then extend our analysis to determining the costs of extra 
bedrooms in houses across locations.  
House prices can be taken as a summary statistic for the way purchasers 
value the location, amenity and housing characteristics in each locality (Can, 
1992; Dubin, 1992; Grimes et al, 2003; Grimes and Aitken, 2004; Meen, 2001). It 
might therefore be reasonable to expect that rentals will be proportionate to house 
prices across locations. But this is not the case. Using 2001 data for New Zealand 
(discussed in greater detail in section 3), Figure 1 demonstrates that, on average, 
rents are high relative to house prices in locations that have high levels of 
deprivation (an increase in the deprivation scale indicates a more deprived area). 
Given that more deprived households have a greater likelihood of renting than do 
less deprived households (Crampton et al, 2000) these relationships imply that 
such households may be caught in a housing cost trap. One contribution of this 
paper is to analyse the reasons behind the existence of this trap. 3 
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Large households, in particular, may be faced with a housing cost trap if 
their rental costs are so high that they are prevented from saving sufficient to 
afford a deposit to purchase a home (DTZ Research, 2004). Evidence shows that 
the nature of this trap differs across locations. For instance, in 2003, the average 
weekly rental cost of a two bedroom dwelling in Auckland was $37 more than for 
a one bedroom dwelling. The cost of a third bedroom was an extra $50 and the 
cost of a fourth bedroom was an additional $90. Thus weekly rental cost for a four 
bedroom dwelling exceeded that of a one bedroom dwelling by $177. In 
Manawatu-Wanganui, the cost of a two bedroom dwelling was $38 more than for 
a one bedroom dwelling - almost identical to the margin in Auckland. But the cost 
of additional bedrooms was much lower than in Auckland: a marginal cost of $29 
for a third bedroom and $33 for a fourth bedroom. It therefore appears easier for 4 
larger renting households to save for a deposit by living in a city such as 
Palmerston North than in Auckland.  
These raw data suggest that it would be beneficial for larger households 
to rent in Manawatu-Wanganui and for smaller households to rent in Auckland. 
However, the interactions with income prospects and other factors have to be 
taken into account before such a conclusion can be reached. At the minimum, the 
data suggests there is a material issue to be addressed relating to disparities in 
regional housing costs for different sized households. The data also suggest that 
there are important issues to be addressed regarding support for renting versus 
buying, especially for more deprived households facing high rental costs relative 
to purchase costs (from the evidence in Figure 1).  
We discuss some social policy implications of these issues in section 6 
of the paper. Before doing so, we undertake an analysis of the determinants of the 
observed data. Section 2 outlines a theoretical model of the relationship between 
rents and house prices across different locations. This model provides a 
framework for the subsequent empirical analysis and for interpreting the 
implications of our findings. In particular, the framework demonstrates that 
simple housing policy solutions, drawn at face value from the data, could place 
low income families in some jeopardy if implemented. Section 3 briefly outlines 
the data used in the study. Section 4 examines the relationship between rents and 
prices for houses and apartments across locations. In this section, we aggregate 
each of houses and apartments across all sizes (but still differentiate between 
houses and apartments). Section 5 extends this analysis to determining the cost of 
additional bedrooms in houses across localities.  5 
2 Theory 
 
2.1 General  Aspects 
Following Capozza and Seguin (1996), we model the housing market as 
one in which standard asset pricing relationships hold. Thus the purchaser of a 
rental property should expect a total return equal to the cost of capital and the 
seller of the rental property should expect a price that reflects this same 
relationship. The cost of capital in turn reflects the risk free rate of interest (e.g. on 
government bonds) plus a risk premium applicable to rental housing. Since 
holdings of rental housing can be diversified across locations, in an efficient 
market there should be no risk premium applicable to a particular location; any 
such location-specific risk is diversifiable and so should have zero price. It is only 
undiversifiable risk that is priced in an efficient market.
2  
We denote the cost of capital for rental housing in period t as 
t µ , the 
one-period rental on a j-bedroom house in location i (set at the start of period t) as 
t
ij R , the price of a j-bedroom house in location i (at the start of period t) as 
t
ij P  and 
the one period expected rate of capital gain on a j-bedroom house in location i (at 
the start of period t) as 
t
ij K . The expected total return on the property in period t is 




ij P ) plus the expected rate of capital gain. This total 
return should equal the cost of capital as in (1): (see next page). 
                                                 
2 For example, see Brealey and Myers (2003).  Recent work by CRESA (Saville-Smith and Fraser, 
2004) indicates that a large proportion of the private rental stock in New Zealand is held by 
"hobbyist" landlords with only one or two rental properties each. They face undiversified location-
specific risk and this risk may be reflected in a premium that they and/or their tenants bear. Our 
functional form accommodates the presence of such location-specific risk premia, although if 
premia exist they are indistinguishable from the expected capital gains component. We interpret 
this latter component purely as a capital gains component; if a location-specific risk premium is 
present, then this component should be thought of as a net capital gain where the location-specific 





ij P )  + 
t
ij K  = 
t µ       ∀ i, j, t       (1) 
From (1) it is clear that the rental yield will only be constant across 
locations in any period if expected capital gains on the price of rental houses are 
equal across locations. This will not normally be the case. Where it is not the case, 
the rental yield will differ across locations. 
For instance, consider a simple example of two locations in which, 
initially, the expected rental over time is constant. With constant cost of capital, 
the house price in each location will be constant over time, the expected rate of 
capital gain will therefore be zero and the rental yields will be equal. Now 
consider a situation in which one location has a temporary downturn in 
desirability - perhaps because of a major new construction project that will take 3 
years to build, lowering rents that can be charged in the area for that period. The 
house price will fall on announcement of the new project (because of the 
reduction in present discounted value of rents that will be received) but will then 
rise over the three years back to the same level as prior to the announcement (and 
back to the same level as in the unaffected location). Expected capital gains will 
therefore be positive during the project's construction phase as the length of time 
of lower rents shortens. Since expected capital gains in this case are positive 
through this period, the rental yield will be lower than in the unaffected location.  
In general, in an efficient market, any factors that are thought to impact 
on the future desirability of an area will be partly reflected in current prices and 
partly reflected in expected capital gains and rentals in such a way as to ensure 




ij P  7 
and
t
ij K ) will depend on the dynamics of the factors affecting the current and 
future desirability of the location. 
2.2 Application 
Equation (1) can be rearranged to give the linear relationship which can 




ij P   = 
t µ  - 
t
ij K         (2) 
In practice, with cross-section data, a constant term can be substituted 
for
t µ  (obviating the need to specify the determinants of the risk premium) and 
variables influencing capital gains expectations can be substituted for 
t
ij K . This 
raises the question of what determines expected capital gains. We address this 
issue by estimating the relationship between past capital gains and variables 
known at the start of the past period.  
Let the set of variables hypothesised to have a potential effect on the 
desirability of an area (and hence on the split between capital gains and rental 
yield) be 
t
ij Z . The elements of 
t
ij Z  are chosen from the literature on house price 
determination (e.g. see Meen, 2001) provided corresponding data is available at 
the required level of disaggregation. We then regress 
1 − t
ij K  on each element of 
1 − t
ij Z  and find the subset of variables that have a significant relationship with 
1 − t
ij K . 
We denote this subset of variables as 
1 − t
ij Y  and use the current values of these 
variables (
t
ij Y ) to proxy 
t
ij K . This approach is a form of rational expectations 
based on the maintained hypothesis that the same variables which determined past 
relative capital gains across areas also determine currently expected relative 8 
capital gains; i.e. that the housing market operates in a stable fashion across areas 
over time. We do not impose the requirement that the capital gains coefficients 
remain stable over time since different macroeconomic effects may change their 
magnitudes. 
Equation (2) imposes a unit elasticity on the relationship between rents 
and prices, as indicated by theory. This relationship can be tested explicitly by 
rearranging (2), incorporating the capital gains elements discussed above, and 
estimating the non-linear relationship: 
ln 
t
ij R  = α1 ln
t
ij P  + ln (β0 + β
t
ij Y )      (3) 
The unit price elasticity can be examined by testing whether the 
restriction α1 = 1 can be rejected.  The term β
t
ij Y  proxies expected capital gains, 
other than the constant term in that relationship which is incorporated into β0; β is 
a vector of coefficients corresponding to the elements of 
t
ij Y . The β0 term includes 
the effect of the cost of capital.  
As discussed in section 3, we have data for each of the i and j aspects of 
t
ij R  in 2001; i.e. we have data for median rents for each of 1 to 5 bedroom houses 
across area units (AUs). We have data on a range of variables hypothesised to be 
included in 
t
ij Z  for each of 2001, 1996 and 1991 at the AU level and have data for 
median house prices in each AU for each of 2001, 1996 and 1991. However we do 
not have the data for house prices disaggregated by the number of bedrooms. For 
our analysis in section 5, we therefore have to proxy 
t
ij P  based on data for 
t
i P  
where 
t
i P  denotes the median price for all-sized houses in area i at time t.  To do 
so, we adopt a structure that relates the (unobserved) price of a j-bedroom house 9 
to the average sized house in an area based on dummies for the number of rented 
bedrooms, as in (4): 
 ln
t
ij P  = Σ
5
1 = j  δjDj + Σ
5
1 = j  εjDjln
t
i P       (4) 
where Dj (j = 1, …, 5) are dummy variables =1 where a rented house has j 
bedrooms and =0 otherwise; δ1, …, δ5 are corresponding intercept coefficients and 
ε1, …, ε5 are corresponding slope coefficients. In section 5, we enter (4) in place 
of α1ln
t
ij P  within equation (3) to give equation (5):  
ln 
t
ij R  = Σ
5
1 = j  δjDj + Σ
5
1 = j  εjDjln
t
i P  + ln (β0 + β
t
ij Y )   (5) 
The structure in (5) makes the δj and εj coefficients invariant to local 
conditions. However the variables in 
t
ij Y  that interact with the housing market in 
determining capital gains may also play a role in determining the price of a 
bedroom across locations. To test whether this is the case, we add further non-
linearity to (5) by allowing each coefficient also to be a function of the elements 
of 
t
ij Y .  Thus for each j, we allow: 
δj = δj 
t
ij Y          ( 6 a )  
εj = εj 
t
ij Y          ( 6 b )  
where 
t
ij Y  includes a constant term and where δj and εj indicate the corresponding 
coefficient vectors. We test whether we can restrict all elements of δj and εj (other 
than those corresponding to the constant term) to zero. If we cannot do so, the 
implication is that factors within 
t
ij Y  affect rents paid for additional bedrooms 10 
across locations, even after allowance is made for the general price of housing and 





We use three main datasets in our analysis, all at area unit (AU) level. 
Area units correspond approximately to suburbs in major cities. The house price 
dataset from Quotable Value New Zealand (QVNZ) provides the median sales 
prices for residential property at AU level. QVNZ is a state-owned entity that 
collects data on all property sales and which values properties for local authority 
property tax purposes. We have measures, from this source, of the QVNZ 
valuation of houses that are sold, and the median sales price. For our work we use 
data from 1991, 1996 and 2001. The second dataset is the tenancy bond data at 
AU level from 2001 obtained from the Ministry of Housing. It contains 
information on the median weekly rent for houses and apartments depending on 
the number of bedrooms. The third major dataset comprises variables from the 
censuses of 1991, 1996 and 2001, as well as the deprivation index based on the 
censuses prepared by the Wellington School of Medicine. 
After preparing the datasets (described below) we cover 1215 area units 
for 2001; 3,206,919 people live in these areas comprising 85.8 % of the New 
Zealand population. The median sales price is $159,707.60 for houses and 
$143,659.40 for flats respectively. The average rented dwelling has 2.66 
bedrooms. 11 
3.2 QVNZ  data 
QVNZ provides data for residential dwellings covering a number of 
categories. In order to gain sales price data for the dwelling types “House” and 
“Flat” we group categories based on the question: “Is it possible to buy a single 
flat in the house or does one have to buy the whole house?” (Our house sales price 
is the weighted average (by number of sales) of the sales prices in the QVNZ 
categories
3 RC, RD and RH; our flats sales price uses categories RF and RR.) 
We use the median sales price in an area unit since it reflects prices that 
have been set by the market. Some of the sales price data is clearly spurious. For 
example one might find a sales price of just $2,660, but a capital value of $65,000 
or vice versa. This can be the result of selling and buying within a family. For 
identifying this spurious data it is possible to compare the median sales price with 
the median capital value in an area unit. The capital value is an estimate of the 
value of the property calculated by QVNZ. One would expect the sales price to be 
close to the capital value. Therefore the ratio of the sales price to the capital value 
should be reasonably close to one. (We do not use the capital value for our 
analysis because it is an estimated value and does not necessarily reflect actual 
market conditions.) Figure 2 shows the distribution of this ratio for New Zealand. 
The majority of the data fulfils the requirement of being close to one; the spurious 
data form the tails of the graph. 
                                                 
3 RD: Dwelling houses of fully detached or semi-detached style on their own clearly defined piece 
of land. 
RH: Home and income. The dwelling is the predominant use and there is an additional unit of use 
attached to, or associated with, the dwelling house which can be used to produce income. 
RC: Converted dwelling houses which are now used as rental flats. 
RR: Rental flats which have been purpose built. 
RF: Ownership units which may be single storey or multi-storey and which do not have the 
appearance of dwelling houses. 12 
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In order to generate a sound dataset, the bottom and top 10 % of the 
ratios in each category (RC, RD, RH, RF and RR) are identified and any dwelling 
type that contains at least one spurious observation on any category is dropped. 
After this cleaning of the data, the sales price: capital value ratio varies between 
0.805 and 1.147. Figure 3 shows the distribution of sales prices for the remaining 
area units after cleaning. 
 
 13 
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3.3 Tenancy  bond  data 
An examination of the tenancy bond dataset indicates that it does not 
contain obviously spurious observations. However we drop observations where 
the owner may set rents that do not necessarily reflect market conditions. Hence 
observations where Housing NZ or the Local Authority is the landlord are 
dropped and only private landlords remain in the dataset. Furthermore, single 
rooms are deleted from the dataset. Figure 4 shows the distribution of rents for the 
remaining data. 14 
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4  Relationship Between Rents & Prices  
This section examines the relationship between rents and prices for each 
of houses and flats at aggregate level (i.e. aggregating all sized houses together 
and aggregating all sized flats together). According to the theory in section 2, 
rents are determined by prices and by expected capital gains. Higher expected 
capital gains should result in a lower rent/price ratio. In order to illustrate the 
validity of this model we initially conduct a simple two-step test.  
At first the rent/price-ratio for 2001 is correlated across AUs with 
socio-economic variables hypothesised to influence the desirability of an area and 
hence influence capital gains. In particular, we examine the relationship between 
this ratio and each of income, deprivation, employment and two separate 15 
education variables.
4 Appendix A contains scatter plots together with linear 
predicted values for each of these relationships, and Table 1 summarises the 
findings. For example, a negative slope coefficient on median income (2001) 
means that in “richer” areas the rent/price-ratio tends to be lower.  
Table 1: Significant relationships between socio-economic factors & the 
rent/price-ratio 
  House Flat 
Median income (2001)  Negative  Negative 
Deprivation index score (2001)  Positive  Positive 
Proportion of people employed (2001)  Negative  Negative 
Proportion of people with no education (2001)  Positive  Positive 
Proportion of people with university degree (2001)  Negative  Negative 
All results are significant at 1% level. 
 
The second step is to compare the same set of variables with the actual 
capital gains that occurred from 1996 to 2001. This allows us to test our model’s 
prediction that factors that have negative impacts on capital gains should lead to a 
higher rent/price-ratio. For example, if capital gains from 1996 to 2001 were 
positively linked to median income in 1996 our model predicts a negative 
relationship of the rent/price-ratio and median income in 2001. Table 2 
summarises the impacts of each of the socio-economic factors on capital gains 
from 1996 to 2001.  Appendix B contains the corresponding scatter plots with the 
linear predicted values. For each of the socio-economic factors the predicted 
relationships hold (except for one case where the sign is as predicted but the result 
is not significant). 
                                                 
4 We use the ratio of the population with no educational qualifications and the ratio with university 
qualifications. Other educational levels have also been tested but are not significant. 16 
Table 2: Impact of socio-economic factors on capital gains (2001/1996) 
  House Flat  Inverse 
relationship 
with rent/price? 
Median income (1996)  Positive Positive  3 
Deprivation index score (1996)  (negative but 
not significant)  Negative  (3) 
Proportion of people employed 
(1996)  Positive Positive  3 
Proportion of people with no 
education (1996)  Negative Negative  3 
Proportion of people with 
university degree (1996)  Positive Positive  3 
All stated results are significant at 1% level. 
 
In order to quantify the relationships of rents, prices and other socio-
economic variables, we estimate equation (3) across AUs for each of houses and 




3 2 1 0 1
uniedu noedu
employment n deprivatio income price rent
β β
β β β β α
+ +
+ + + + =
         (7) 
where rent and price are as described in section 3 (using median tenancy bond and 
QVNZ data respectively); income is the median income in the AU; deprivation is 
the AU's deprivation index score; employment is the proportion of people aged 
over 15 in employment; noedu is the proportion of people with no educational 
qualification; and uniedu is the proportion of people with a university 
qualification.  
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the resulting non-linear least squares 
estimates for houses. The deprivation variable includes some aspects of income, 
employment and education and these may be priced into capital gains in a fashion 
that differs from the price implied by their weighting within the deprivation scale. 
This could complicate the interpretation of the coefficients estimated when all five 17 
capital gains proxies are included. To test the robustness of our estimates to this 
possibility, column 2 presents the results with deprivation omitted, while column 
3 presents the results with deprivation included but with the remaining four capital 
gains proxies excluded. 
The results indicate that house prices are a major determinant of rents, 
albeit with a coefficient of around one half rather than unity (we discuss possible 
reasons for this further below). The socio-economic variables hypothesised to 
influence capital gains are also important. Higher deprivation increases rents for a 
given house price as indicated previously by the graphs. In addition, each of 
income, employment and the two education variables impact significantly on rents 
in at least one of the specifications. 18 
Table 3: Results of estimating (7): Houses (Non-Linear)* 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS  OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV 
α1  0.4345 0.4237 0.5524 0.5495 0.5144 0.6291 
Price  (29.43)* (26.50)* (48.29)* (34.27)* (29.05)* (48.72)* 
β0  -0.4710 1.4646 0.1274 -0.3185 0.4237 0.0400 
Const  (2.80)* (4.59)* (3.74)* (4.98)* (4.07)* (2.73)* 
β1  0.0160  0.0175  0.0042  0.0056  
Income  (3.55)*  (3.21)*  (3.16)*  (2.64)*  
β2  0.0014  0.0001  0.0005  0.0001 
Deprivation  (5.30)*  (6.60)*  (5.29)*  (7.28)* 
β3  -0.1048 -0.9331    0.0993 -0.1639   
Employment  (0.82)    (3.63)*  (3.64)*  (2.51)
+  
β4  -0.5712 -0.1396    -0.0981 0.0656   
No edu  (2.65)*  (0.71)    (2.15)
+ (1.28)   
β5  0.4843  0.6141  0.1313  0.2754  
University 
edu 
(2.78)*  (2.83)*  (2.61)*  (3.01)*  
Adj.R
2  0.8156 0.7845 0.7689 0.8244 0.7789 0.7810 
s.e.  0.1332 0.1441 0.1490 0.1299 0.1459 0.1450 
N  798 798 798 798 798 798 
*  β1 coefficients are multiplied by 1,000; t-values in parentheses; *significant at 1% level; 
+significant at 5% level. 
 19 
Table 4: Results of estimating (7): Apartments (Non-Linear)* 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  OLS OLS  OLS  IV  IV  IV 
α1  0.2946  0.3101 0.4622 0.3244  0.3312 0.4730 
Price  (9.15)* (9.35)* (18.40)* (9.16)* (9.14)* (15.26)* 
β0  0.4510  5.0152 0.7378 0.2242  3.2732 0.8360 
Const (0.37)  (2.31)
+ (2.67)* (0.24) (2.03)
+ (2.37)
+ 
β1  0.0969  0.0673  0.1075  0.0872  
Income (1.95)  (1.79)  (1.98)  (1.88)  
β2  0.0051   -0.00007  0.0032  -0.0002 
Deprivation (2.31)
+   (0.60)  (2.11)
+   (1.54) 
β3  0.2794  -1.2208  -0.4286  -1.1778  
Employment  (0.28)  (1.11)  (0.50)  (1.17)  
β4  -8.4783  -4.8516  -3.8053  -2.1141  
No edu  (2.15)
+  (1.93)  (1.83)  (1.51)  




+  (1.93)  (1.69)  (1.32)  
Adj.R
2  0.5881  0.5578 0.5077 0.5325  0.5103 0.4356 
s.e.  0.1716  0.1775 0.1874 0.1831  0.1871 0.2006 
N  415  415 415 415  415 415 
* β1 coefficients are multiplied by 1,000; t-values in parentheses; *significant at 1% 
level; 
+significant at 5% level. 
Table 4 presents corresponding results for apartments. The results 
explain much less of the variation in rents and are not as robust as for houses. This 
is likely to reflect the fewer observations available for apartments and the 
possibility that apartments are more differentiated than are houses. However, 20 
some similarities with the house results are apparent, particularly the "low", but 
significant, coefficient on the price variable. 
In each case, there is the potential for endogeneity of the regressors to 
cause inconsistent estimates. Our theory suggests that rents, prices and capital 
gains expectations are formed simultaneously. Further, each of the socio-
economic variables could be affected by the level of rents (e.g. the proportion of 
the population in an area with no formal education might be partially determined, 
through migration and location choices, by rents charged in that area). To test the 
sensitivity of our results to potential simultaneity bias, we re-estimate each of the 
three equations for houses and for apartments using instrumental variables (IV). 
We replace each of the six regressors with their 1996 values and present the 
estimation results as columns 4 - 6 in the two tables.  
The results do not vary substantially for each of the formulations, 
especially with respect to the impacts of prices, incomes and deprivation. One 
remaining quandary is the relatively low coefficient on prices indicating an 
elasticity of rents to prices of around one half instead of unity. The non-linear 
functional form is driven by the theory in section 2, but it is possible that the non-
linearity is disguising the "true" elasticity of rents to prices. We test this 
possibility by replacing equation (7) with a linear functional form: 
uniedu noedu
employment n deprivatio income price rent
5 4
3 2 1 0 1 ln ln ln ln ln
β β
β β β β α
+ +
+ + + + =
(8) 
The results for houses and apartments are presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
The results are little changed. The coefficient on the price term remains around 
one half rather than unity. We surmise that this result may be due to a composition 
effect. Our price series represents the median sale price of all houses sold in an 21 
AU in a particular year. This includes rented and owner-occupied dwellings. In a 
low price area, it is likely that the rental stock and owner-occupied stock are of 
similar quality; hence the observed aggregate price is an adequate proxy for the 
price of rental dwellings. By contrast, it is quite conceivable in high price areas 
that relatively low quality houses within the area will tend to be rented. If this is 
the case, the relationship of rentals prices to aggregate prices will be upward 
sloping but with a coefficient of less than one. This relationship will then be 
reflected in our estimates and, if the theoretical relationship outlined in section 2 
holds, the elasticity of rents to prices would reflect this composition effect. 
Without additional data, we cannot determine whether the estimated coefficient(s) 
represent this effect or some other factor.
5 
                                                 
5 Future work, using panel data, could identify if composition is having an effect on the estimates, 
provided composition effects are stable over time. 22 
Table 5: Results of estimating (8): Houses (Linear)* 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS OLS OLS  IV  IV  IV 
α1  0.4311 0.4291 0.5528 0.5486 0.5217 0.6300 
Price  (28.75)* (26.26)* (48.31)* (34.61)* (29.40)* (48.88)* 
β0  -12.310 -2.0285 -5.0344  -15.7505  -2.4866 -6.8125 
Const  (13.00)* (4.28)*  (7.84)* (15.88)* (5.42)*  (9.87)* 
β1  0.2684  0.2021  0.2251  0.1484  
Income  (5.86)*  (4.07)*  (5.15)*  (3.03)*  
β2  1.4384  0.5402  1.8252  0.6786 
Deprivation (12.23)*    (6.57)* (14.67)*    (7.82)* 
β3  -0.0266 -0.3671    0.1912 -0.1653   
Employment  (0.40)  (5.64)*  (3.45)*  (2.94)*  
β4  -0.6460 -0.1387    -0.3743 0.1490   
No edu  (4.53)*  (0.93)    (3.30)*  (1.23)   




*  (3.24)*  (4.18)*  
Adj.R
2  0.8149 0.7802 0.7689 0.8245 0.7771 0.7813 
s.e.  0.1335 0.1455 0.1492 0.1300 0.1465 0.1451 
N  798 798 798 798 798 798 
* t-values in parentheses; *significant at 1% level; 
+significant at 5% level. 
.  
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Table 6: Results of estimating (8): Apartments (Linear)* 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS OLS OLS  IV  IV  IV 
α1  0.2905 0.3041 0.4610  0.3280 0.3302 0.4697 
Price (9.00)*  (9.12)*  (18.23)*  (9.09)*  (8.95)*  (15.01)* 
β0  -10.2411  -1.5993 0.4206 -10.7423  -2.9959 2.4496 
Const (5.97)*  (2.09)
+ (0.34) (5.57)*  (3.41)* (1.82) 
β1  0.4455 0.3380    0.5365 0.4437   
Income (5.52)*  (4.16)*   (5.94)*  (4.93)*   
β2  1.1562  -0.1166  1.0277  -0.4221 
Deprivation (5.58)*    (0.75)  (4.48)*    (2.53)
+ 
β3  -0.0697 -0.2295    -0.0987 -0.2221   
Employment (0.58)  (1.91)    (0.79)  (1.77)   
β4  -1.7399 -1.2381    -1.0592 -0.6714   
No edu  (6.62)
* (4.84)
*  (4.39)*  (2.92)*  
β5  -1.1039 -0.8565    -0.7548 -0.4848   
University 
edu 
(4.83)* (3.69)*    (2.81)*  (1.81)   
Adj.R
2 0.5905  0.5603  0.5079  0.5308  0.5088  0.4366 
s.e. 0.1709  0.1771  0.1874  0.1830  0.1872  0.2005 
N 415  415  415  415  415  415   
* t-values in parentheses; *significant at 1% level; 
+significant at 5% level. 
 
A comparison of the results in Tables 3 and 4 with those in Tables 5 
and 6 show that while the former are theoretically preferred (with the functional 
form being derived exactly from theory) the latter perform statistically just as 
well. Given this finding, in the following section we adopt the linear functional 24 
form in estimating the determinants of rents for additional bedrooms across areas. 
This is particularly useful given the added coefficient non-linearities that we wish 
to test in that work.  
 
5  Rental Costs of Extra Bedrooms 
Having examined the determinants of rents at the aggregate (all 
bedroom) level we turn now to estimating the cost of additional bedrooms across 
areas. For reasons of space, and given the relative lack of observations on 
apartments, we restrict our attention here to houses, although preliminary work 
shows apartments to follow similar pricing principles. We omit five bedroom 
houses owing to the small number of observations for that group. 
We use equation (5) from section 2 as our basis. We express it in a 
slightly different, but equivalent, form by including a constant term plus three 
intercept dummies for 2, 3 and 4 bedroom houses; similarly, we include lnPi plus 
three slope dummies representing interactions between the number of bedrooms 
and the price. Given the results in section 4 showing little difference between the 
linear and non-linear versions, we linearise the equation and estimate the form 
shown in (9): 
 ln  ij R  = δ0 + Σ
4
2 = j δjDj + ε0ln i P  + Σ
4
2 = j εjDj.ln i P  + Σ
5
1 = k βk ki Y        (9) 
where Y1 is ln income 
Y2 is ln deprivation 
Y3 is ln employment 
Y4 is noedu 
Y5 is uniedu 
Each of the variables is as defined in section 4. In keeping with section 
4, we estimate the equations both with OLS on 2001 data and with IV using the 
1996 data to instrument for each of the regressors. The results are shown in Table 25 
7. The elasticity of one-bedroom rents with respect to prices (ε0) increases with 
the IV estimates (to 0.65) which is more in keeping with theoretical priors. This 
result indicates likely endogeneity in the OLS estimates. However the rent to price 
elasticity falls for larger sized houses, and the intercept terms also change. 



































































* t-values in parentheses; *significant at 1% level; 
+significant at 5% level. 
We test for equality of intercept and slope coefficients across bedrooms. 
The Wald test for δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = 0 rejects the restriction at the 1% level in both the 
OLS and IV specifications. This implies that the intercept term differs according 
to the number of bedrooms in the house. The Wald test for ε2 = ε3 = ε4 = 0 rejects 26 
this restriction at the 1% level in both the OLS and IV specifications. Thus the 
slope coefficients on the price term also differ according to the number of 
bedrooms. Finally, the joint set of restrictions that δ2 = δ3 = δ4 = ε2 = ε3 = ε4 = 0 is 
rejected at the 1% level in both the OLS and IV specifications. 
The results therefore indicate that not only does the average rent of 
houses in an area increase with average sale prices in an area, but the rental price 
of additional bedrooms also varies according to the price of houses. To give an 
indication of how material each of the effects is, we calculate the estimated 
weekly rent for each sized house (where R1, R2, R3, R4 correspond to the 
estimated weekly rents for 1, 2, 3 and 4 bedroom houses respectively). The 
estimates use mean values for each variable in 2001 and 1996 and use the 
corresponding estimates from columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. The results are 
presented in the first row of Tables 8 and 9 using the OLS and IV estimates 
respectively. The last three columns of each table show the price of an additional 
room (e.g. R2-R1 is the rent for a 2-bedroom house less the rent for a 1-bedroom 
house). The estimated rents are very similar using the two sets of estimates.  27 
Table 8: Effect of Variables on Rents ($ per week) - OLS (2001 data)* 
  R1 R2 R3 R4  R2-R1  R3-R2  R4-R3 
All @ means  119.40 169.28 197.56 230.02  49.88  28.28  32.46 
Price: - 1SD  97.41 140.46 159.23 180.13 43.05 18.77 20.89
Income: - 1SD  110.60 156.80 183.00 213.07 46.21 26.20 30.07
Deprivation: - 1SD  132.03 187.19 218.47 254.36 55.16 31.27 35.89
All (ex.Price): -1 SD  114.13 161.81 188.84 219.87 47.68 27.03 31.02
All: -1SD  93.07 134.20 152.13 172.09 41.13 17.93 19.96
All: +1SD  153.38 213.82 256.90 307.85 60.44 43.08 50.95
All variable changes, other than the last row, are "for the worse"; i.e. a decrease in price, income, 
employment, university qualifications; and an increase in deprivation and no educational 
qualifications. Changes in the last row all "for the better". 
 
Table 9: Effect of Variables on Rents ($ per week) - IV (1996 data)* 
  R1 R2 R3 R4  R2-R1  R3-R2  R4-R3 
All @ means  120.91 169.30 197.99 229.12  48.40  28.69  31.13 
Price: - 1SD  89.70 135.08 154.14 173.79 45.38 19.06 19.65
Income: - 1SD  114.22 159.95 187.05 216.46 45.72 27.10 29.41
Deprivation: - 1SD  136.01 190.45 222.72 257.74 54.44 32.27 35.02
All (ex.Price): -1 SD  118.50 165.93 194.05 224.56 47.43 28.12 30.51
All: -1SD  87.92 132.39 151.07 170.33 44.47 18.68 19.26
All: +1SD  166.22 216.44 259.40 308.12 50.22 42.97 48.71
All variable changes, other than the last row, are "for the worse"; i.e. a decrease in price, income, 
employment, university qualifications; and an increase in deprivation and no educational 
qualifications. Changes in the last row all "for the better". 
The second row of each table shows the rents for different sized houses 
where house prices are reduced one standard deviation below their mean in 2001 
and 1996 respectively. In 2001, this means reducing the house price from the 
mean of $148,227 to $89,089, while in 1996, it means reducing the house price 
from $128,695 to $81,244. The one standard deviation reductions are of different 
sizes in the two years because of different distributions in the data, so the results 
are not directly comparable across the two data sets. They are nevertheless 
qualitatively similar; henceforth we discuss just the preferred IV (Table 9) results 
unless otherwise specified. Rents, as may be expected, are reduced across the 
board. More pertinent to the questions posed at the outset of this study is the 
sizeable difference in the cost of an extra bedroom, especially for larger houses. 
The cost of four bedrooms relative to two bedrooms falls from $59.82 to $38.71 
per week (a fall of $10.65 per extra bedroom) whereas the cost of the second 28 
bedroom relative to the first falls by only $3.02. Thus rents for larger houses tend 
to be much cheaper in lower price areas relative to high price areas than is the 
case with smaller houses. 
Rows 3 and 4 show the effects of a one standard deviation reduction in 
income, ceteris paribus, and a one standard deviation "worsening" in deprivation 
(i.e. an increase in deprivation). A fall in incomes is reflected in lower rents while 
greater deprivation leads to a rise in rents. The latter effect is particularly marked: 
a one standard deviation worsening in deprivation is associated with a 12.5% 
increase in rents across the board. This effect is theoretically associated with 
lower capital gains expectations in more deprived areas.  
It would, however, be unusual to see deprivation or income change in 
isolation from other variables. Row 5 indicates the estimated rents for different 
sized houses if all variables other than house prices were to worsen by one 
standard deviation. In this case, the effects are more or less offsetting, and rents 
are 98% of their mean level (using 1996 data; 95.6% using 2001 data). If prices 
are also reduced by one standard deviation (row 6), the price effect dominates. 
The cost of a third and a fourth bedroom is each around $19 per week, compared 
with a cost of around $30 for each of the third and fourth bedroom when all 
variables are at their means. 
To further emphasise this contrast in the cost of extra bedrooms as price 
and other variables change across areas, the last row increases all variables by one 
standard deviation. Comparing the last two rows shows a realistic divergence in 
rents for different sized houses between "rich" and "poor" suburbs. In rich 
suburbs, not only are rents much higher, but also the price of each additional 
bedroom stays in a range of $42 - $51 per week. By contrast, in poor suburbs, the 29 
price of a second bedroom is in the same range, but the price of third and fourth 
bedrooms falls to around $19 each. 
The estimates presented above allow for socio-economic influences 
such as deprivation to impact on rents in an area, but that specification does not 
allow these influences to impact on the price of additional bedrooms across 
different areas. To examine whether socio-economic influences impact on the 
pricing of additional bedrooms, we interacted each of the income and deprivation 
terms with the intercept and price terms as in (6a) and (6b) of section 2. We then 
tested whether these interaction effects were significant with Wald tests. Each of 
the interactions of deprivation with intercept and slope terms was not significantly 
different from zero, and almost all income interactions were similarly 
insignificant. (The only significant effect for the latter occurred for 1-bedroom 
houses, but the effect was small.) We therefore do not report these results here.  
 
6 Implications 
Our results are noteworthy in a number of respects. First, the rental 
market appears to be efficient in the sense that areas with high expected capital 
gains have lower rental yields than areas with low expected capital gains. This 
finding is based on an assumption that capital gains expectations are formed in a 
forward-looking manner based on latest information, using influences seen to be 
important in determining past capital gains.  
We show that high levels of deprivation are associated with low capital 
gains expectations; in other words, deprived areas are expected to remain in the 
doldrums, while areas of low deprivation are expected to outperform. Thus more 30 
deprived areas have higher rent to price ratios than do less deprived areas. While 
this may seem "unfair" for renters in more deprived areas, it is a natural 
consequence of landlords (and house sellers) seeking the same return across all 
areas when investing in (and selling) rental housing. 
Overall, the influences on expectations are complex, reflecting income, 
employment and education outcomes specifically, as well as overall deprivation. 
Accounting for all these effects, the main determinant of rents in an area is house 
prices in that area. 
Our second major finding is that the relative rents of different sized 
houses is crucially dependent on the level of house prices. Areas with low house 
prices tend to have more compressed relativities between rents of large and small 
houses than is the case with high house price areas (both in relative and absolute 
terms).  
This latter finding is important when considering housing in a social 
policy context. After accounting for other influences, the effect of this 
compression will be to induce larger families to locate in lower priced areas and 
smaller families to locate in higher priced areas. On the assumption that children 
are more likely to live in larger than average households, the effect is to group 
households with children together in lower priced areas (over and above any life-
cycle affordability effects). This grouping may have certain social capital benefits 
(e.g. through the grouping of households with shared interests) but it may also 
have negative social consequences. In particular, it may place added stress on 
resources required to service children and families in poorer (lower priced) areas. 
If provision of such services fails to meet the more intensive demand, negative 31 
consequences can emerge (e.g. through inadequate child-care, schooling, health 
services, parks, etc).  
Further, there may be employment and other social and environmental 
consequences of this compression. Larger families may choose to locate in low 
priced areas, but the low prices may reflect lack of job prospects (e.g. in some 
rural or semi-rural locations). Rental costs of larger houses may therefore act to 
increase mis-match between jobs and potential workforce participants - especially 
those with families - across the country. Alternatively, people may locate to lower 
priced areas, but with long commute times to available work, placing greater 
pressure on transport links and energy use. 
While these effects may each be important, potential policy responses 
have to be considered with care. Policies to subsidise housing can be capitalised 
into the price (and/or the rent) with benefits accruing primarily to the existing 
owner, and not necessarily to the recipient of the subsidy. Policy responses that 
ensure services are up to scratch in areas with larger families help address the 
negative social impacts that may arise from the grouping together of such 
households, but will also tend to be reflected (through pricing of amenity values) 
in house prices. Policies to provide income relief to larger households have less of 
a distortionary effect on the housing market but have other complications, not 
least of which is fiscal cost and hence the overall burden of taxation.  
Encouraging home ownership is often viewed as a policy with positive 
outcomes both socially and for more disadvantaged people that become house 
owners. However, our theoretical framework and empirical results indicate that 
care must be taken with such a policy initiative. Encouraging home ownership 
amongst renters in areas with high rents (relative to prices) may have the effect of 32 
inducing lower income families to make housing investments in areas with low 
prospective capital gains. This outcome could, in turn, perpetuate their relative 
disadvantage. 
Given the complexities associated with housing policy, it is likely that 
some mixture of policy responses will be appropriate. Whatever the responses, it 
is important to ensure that negative social effects arising from concentration of 
large families in relatively cheap rental accommodation is minimised if long term 
disadvantage associated with housing conditions is to be avoided.  
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